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In this piece, Rob Kass brings to bear his insights
from a long career in both theoretical and applied
statistics to reflect on the disconnect between what
we teach and what we do. Not content to focus just
on didactic and professional matters, the focus of
his 2009 article (Brown and Kass, 2009), in this
commentary he proposes a remake of the founda-
tions of inference. He proposes to replace two fun-
damental “isms”—frequentism and Bayesianism—
with a new “ism”—“pragmatism;” an approach that
he puts forward as more ecumenical and practical,
enshrining in foundations what good statisticians al-
ready do.
There is a lot to commend in this piece, partic-
ularly the emphasis on the subjunctive nature of
all model-based inference, and I am sure the other
commentators will do justice to its strengths. But in
spite of its clarity and initial promise, I found Kass’s
proposal ultimately unsatisfying. It seems less a new
foundational philosophy than a call for a truce, one
of many over the years. It is telling that all of the ex-
amples show practical equivalence between Bayesian
and frequentist estimates, so the biggest stakes here
seem to be what people think, not what they do. The
difficulty with “big tent” foundations is that in cir-
cumstances where different philosophies within the
tent dictate different actions, there is no guidance
as to what route to take.
It is interesting to contrast this with the philo-
sophic version of “pragmatism,” originally put forth
by the polymath C. S. Peirce in the late 1800s [also
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credited with proposing the log-likelihood ratio as
a measure of evidence (Hacking, 1965)], whose intel-
lectual heirs includedWilliam James, Thomas Dewey,
W. V. O. Quine and Richard Rorty. Pragmatism em-
braced three maxims, the most important of which
was that the meaning of ideas was defined by their
practical, observable effects. Ideas that made no ma-
terial difference in the real world had no meaning.
Kass alludes to a possible difference in real-world
consequences just once, in his mention of the analy-
sis of high-dimensional data sets. But he states his
pragmatist philosophy is agnostic on how to ap-
proach these, and that the choice should be “ac-
cording to their performance under theoretical con-
ditions thought to capture relevant real-world vari-
ation in a particular applied setting.” It would have
been extraordinarily useful to see such an example,
and if indeed there could be a model-based resolu-
tion of what are often quite difficult conundrums.
In the domain with which I am most familiar,
clinical trials, the traditional frequentist-Bayesian
inferential dilemma arises most commonly in the
interpretation of “early stopped” trials, that is to
say, should the inference depend upon the stopping
rule, and if so, how? This becomes particularly acute
when the stopping is due to an unplanned analysis.
This particular situation arose recently in the high-
profile case of the diabetes drug Avandia. In 2007,
a meta-analysis was published that raised concern
about the cardiovascular risks of Avandia (Nissen
and Wolski, 2007), leading to calls that the FDA
should remove the drug from the market. The RE-
CORD trial was being conducted in Europe to ex-
amine the efficacy and safety of Avandia, and its in-
dustry sponsor requested an unplanned analysis in
response to the new data. This analysis (arguably)
indicated no excess cardiac risk, and this interim re-
sult was then published, at the behest of the spon-
sor (Home et al., 2007; Nissen, 2010). Many doubted
that an interim result that had demonstrated excess
risk would have been published and discounted the
result. How should this be sorted out? What are the
dimensions of “real-world variation” here that we
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should include in the model, and on what grounds
do we determine how to measure the evidence and
how to act? This was a real decision, with real, big-
time consequences. What guidance would “statisti-
cal pragmatism” give us in skirmishes like that?
Kass says he has been guided by “past and present
sages,” but leaves the job of naming them to Bar-
nett (1999). Kass is right that many have preceded
him on this path, and it would have been quite il-
luminating to compare this proposal more directly
to those of his predecessors. Among the several I
would have liked to have seen contrasted would be
George Box, whose descriptions of the theoretical
nature and pragmatic utility of models, which he
adjoined to his attempts to resolve the Bayesian-
frequentist “deadlock,” are remarkably similar to
this essay in spirit, if not in substance. Box’s pa-
per on Fisher’s ecumenicism, “Science and Statis-
tics” (Box, 1976), included graphics not so different
than those found here, albeit with a more promi-
nent role for experimental “filter” through which
we see the world. He thought it important that our
“wrong” models be subject to continual revision in
accord with changes in scientific understanding, one
of Kass’s central points.
Interestingly, in a response to a 1990 essay by Glen
Shafer in this journal on the “Unity and Diversity
of Probability,” which had similar aims to this one
(Shafer, 1990), Box (1990) stated “There is another
substantive issue I would like to raise. This concerns
the fatal fascination of the word ‘unity.’ Unity in
many things is desirable, but we should not be trying
to impose ‘oneness’ on a situation where ‘twoness’
is of the essence.” One wonders if he would make
the same comment here. He went on to characterize
statistical inference as reducible to model fitting and
model criticism, claiming that Bayesians are better
at fitting, frequentists better at criticism, and that
we need to be good at both.
It is interesting to look to the field of bioethics to
see how it deals with a variety of foundational the-
ories seemingly at odds with each other, but which
capture important features of desirable ethical con-
duct. Two dominant theories are utilitarian (or con-
sequentialist), which focus on outcomes (somewhat
akin to frequentist approaches) and deontologic,
which focus on the intrinsic morality of how peo-
ple treat each other, which has some parallels to
Bayesian logic (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001).
These underlying ethical philosophies provided, as
all philosophies must, competing definitions for foun-
dational concepts, which in ethics include moral
goods and moral duties.
However, in looking for ethical principles that
should guide clinical research, ethicists borrowed from
multiple traditions, enshrining that guidance in the
Belmont report, which did not try to resolve foun-
dational differences (National Commission, 1979).
The three principles it espoused were (1) Respect
for persons (autonomy), a primarily deontologic con-
struct; (2) Beneficence (and non-maleficence), mainly
utilitarian, and (3) Justice (fair distribution of harms
and benefits), derived from yet other moral philoso-
phies. These principles are sometimes in tension, re-
flecting their different foundational pedigrees, keep-
ing ethicists in business. But the Belmont princi-
ples have still proven to be enormously influential
and useful, capturing the key features of each the-
ory, translating them into the applied domain, and
providing a framework for regulation and for ethical
debate.
So perhaps Kass’s proposal might be best framed
not as a statistical philosophy, but as the beginning
of a code governing statistical conduct and teach-
ing. It could embrace such things as a desire for
Bayesianly coherent procedures that have good fre-
quentist properties, and perhaps provide guidance
on the kinds of difficult questions that Kass has
posed in his previous writings (Kass, 2006). Such
a code need not resolve foundational differences, as
statistical pragmatism does not, but it can distill the
desiderata of those philosophies down to a kernel of
principles applicable to all applied problems, implic-
itly endorsing goals of competing philosophies that
most would support. I can see all the pieces of such
a code here, but it would take some further work to
abstract them.
In summary, I welcome this as an insightful piece
with admirable goals, most of which I and, I sus-
pect, other statisticians share. But whether those
goals are best met by replacing our foundational the-
ories, or by distilling and collectively endorsing the
aspects of those theories that are most useful, is an
open question. I believe that there are difficult infer-
ential and decision problems that defy any founda-
tional attempt at resolution, and that their origins
are found outside statistics, in the incompleteness
of our substantive knowledge. This creates the gap
Kass highlights between our theoretical models and
reality, a gap that certainly deserves to be front and
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center in any conversations about statistical proce-
dures or results. But we still must draw conclusions
and take action. I did not find an improved guide
to such actions in this piece, but I did appreciate
its renewed call to not let foundational dogma de-
termine which direction we take. If this piece can
serve as a step toward doing for statistics what the
Belmont Report did for research ethics, it will have
served a very important role.
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